The Hidden Costs of Dissent by Tsai, Robert L.




The Hidden Costs of Dissent 
Robert L. Tsai 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tsai, Robert L., "The Hidden Costs of Dissent" (2019). Constitutional Commentary. 1204. 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1204 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Constitutional Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
05 TSAI_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2019 11:02 AM 
 
489 
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF DISSENT 
PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A 
DIVIDED NATION. By Robert L. Tsai. W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2019. Pp. 276. $27.95 (Cloth). 
Robert L. Tsai1 
It’s not every day an author is fortunate enough to have such 
accomplished scholars and committed egalitarians engage so 
thoughtfully with his ideas, so I wish to begin by thanking 
Professors Franita Tolson and Nelson Tebbe for engaging with 
the arguments in Practical Equality. Each took the time to 
separately review the book, but for reasons of efficiency I’ll 
combine my response.2 
Both Tolson and Tebbe believe, as I do, in a more robust 
theory of equality than the thin gruel that has emerged from the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Indeed, they are way ahead of me 
in articulating compelling normative visions of a just and equal 
society.3 Yet they also see, as I do, that thicker accounts of 
equality—and most rights generally—won’t find much traction 
before the High Court any time soon. Thus, we share the sense 
that a supplemental theory might be necessary to accompany our 
preferred ideal theory of equality. 
 
 1.  Clifford Scott Green Visiting Professor of Constitutional Law, Temple 
University, Beasley School of Law (Fall 2019); Professor of Law, American University, 
Washington College of Law. My deep appreciation to Brian Bix and Constitutional 
Commentary for organizing and publishing this mini-symposium. 
 2. The book emerged some different threads of my work, one of which was a 
generative collaboration with Nelson Tebbe: Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
459 (2010). 
 3. See NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017); 
FRANITA TOLSON, IN CONGRESS WE TRUST?: THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL VOTING 
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT (forthcoming 2019); 
Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter Qualifications Clause 
of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159 (2015); Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111 
(2011). 
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Practical Equality strives to do just that, by coming up with 
an approach that’s compatible with most theories of equality, 
while helping decisionmakers to sidestep troublesome pitfalls that 
more often than not lead to indecision and the reinforcement of 
unjust conditions. In that sense, the book offers not a 
comprehensive account of equality, i.e., what an egalitarian 
society should look like in the best of worlds, but instead the 
description of an egalitarian ethic and a set of work-arounds, built 
on past experiences, that can be used in the deeply flawed 
circumstances that we often find ourselves. 
I’m grateful both reviewers see “significant power”4 in the 
approach I have outlined, which holds that embattled egalitarians 
can, and sometimes should, look for ways to do the work of 
equality by other means when they run into major roadblocks. 
These second-order concepts—many of which tie “equality to 
broader notions of dignity and fairness”5—can, as Tolson says, 
“preserve gains” as well as “find common ground where none 
existed before . . . all in the name of justice.”6 Doing the work of 
practical egalitarianism isn’t about reconciliation or enforcing 
norms of civility; rather, it’s about finding people where they are 
ideologically and forging a series of compromises both big and 
small, in as many different ways as possible, to advance the goals 
of equality. 
Because Tolson and Tebbe start out as steadfast egalitarians, 
most of their concerns about my approach have to do with settling 
for too little. That is to say, they worry that when people move to 
pursue an alternative remedy, they might be either leaving 
winning equality arguments on the table or foreclosing the 
possibility of making broader equality arguments in the future. I 
want to spend some time trying to allay those concerns. 
 
 4. Nelson Tebbe, Should the Left Dissent?, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 465 (2019). 
 5. Franita Tolson, Practical Equality and the Limits of Second Best Strategies for 
Justice, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 477, 480 (2019)(“Tsai’s book persuasively shows that 
second-order doctrines can work in place of equality arguments.”). 
 6. There are different ways to talk about the overlap between concepts like equality 
and fairness. Some philosophers, such as Jeremy Waldron, refer to the “redundancy 
thesis.” JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS 72–83 (2017). Others talk about 
different reasons one might object to a form of inequality, and there can be a synergy 
between those different but related reasons. T.M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY 
MATTER? (2018). See generally Robert L. Tsai, How We Talk About Equality, L.A. REV. 
OF BOOKS, Aug. 22, 2019 (reviewing Waldron’s One Another’s Equals, Scanlon’s Why 
Does Inequality Matter?, and Keri Leigh Merritt’s Masterless Men). 
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There’s no doubt the American tradition of dissent is 
compelling. But there are also hidden costs associated with 
dissenting if there is a real chance of reaching an accord that can 
reduce the unequal burdens faced by someone or some group. 
Making tradeoffs between possible solutions is always difficult, 
for they entail choosing which kinds of arguments to invest in and 
which ones to bypass. More resources put into one kind of 
argument means fewer resources for another kind of argument. 
But it’s not just the availability of arguments in the ecosystem we 
should care about; we should also care about avoiding terrible, 
demoralizing losses, and reducing inequities in ways that can build 
momentum for future progress. 
* 
Tolson acknowledges the importance of second-order 
preferences and strategies when it comes to doing the work of 
equality,7 but thinks that there remain circumstances in which 
“equality must be overt, express, and uncompromising.” She says 
equality has to have the capacity to be “both practical and 
radical.”8 I heartily agree. 
So, what are the circumstances in which demands for equality 
must remain explicit and exacting? I think the most obvious 
situations are those where the most critical social goods are at 
stake: life, liberty, education, as well as fundamental rights like 
free speech, marriage, and so forth. Furthermore, the nature and 
scope of the restraint matters. Where a group has been 
categorically or mostly excluded from access to an important 
social good, the rhetoric of equality is not just appropriate, it’s the 
most effective way to break down a long-standing barrier. It 
would be foolish to lay down one’s big guns. 
But there are many other situations where categorical 
exclusions aren’t at issue, or the social good at issue is deeply 
contested (say, a right to migrate between countries), or the 
 
 7. For instance, she finds that “[w]ider reliance on notions of fair play could have 
special resonance in the death penalty context, where equality arguments have explicitly 
failed.” Tolson, supra note 5, at 478. She also agrees that the tiers-of-scrutiny approach to 
handling equality claims, first developed in the 1930s, is “a very unattractive method of 
comparing suffering.” Id. at 479. As I’ve argued, that cumbersome and outdated means of 
talking about equality has itself become an impediment to justice. When the project of 
equality is reduced to comparing battle scars, everyone loses (pp. 101–105). 
 8. Tolson, supra note 5, at 477. 
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institutional setting significantly complicates a person’s claim to 
an otherwise valuable social good (say, the claimant is in prison 
or another country). In those scenarios, it may be more justifiable 
to compromise, at least situationally, to relieve unequal suffering. 
Doing so doesn’t necessarily mean giving up on egalitarian 
objectives; it could just mean finding another way of solving a 
particular problem and living to fight another day. 
Tolson is absolutely correct that we need to have a keen sense 
of the limits of specific second-order alternatives to equality, as 
well as its benefits. Different solutions carry with them different 
forms of relief. Some of the justifications overlap overtly with 
those associated with equality (e.g., due process), while other 
solutions advance the goals of egalitarianism in more indirect 
ways (e.g., by requiring related methods). 
It’s also true, as she points out, that striking down wartime 
policies such as race-based confinement, based on reasonableness 
grounds, would not be exactly the same as calling it out as a racist 
policy. But sometimes a stronger, condemnatory solution just 
doesn’t seem possible. 
By the time the Japanese-American internment cases were 
being considered, the Justices had already approved an explicitly 
race-based curfew by a unanimous vote. Chief Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone, who was sensitive to the concerns of minority 
oppression in other contexts, nevertheless wrote the Court’s 
opinion upholding the racist curfew; Justices Douglas, Murphy, 
and Rutledge had also forsaken people of Japanese ancestry.9 
Facing long odds, then, a decision that struck down internment in 
Korematsu as unreasonable, which I propose in my book, would 
be a different answer that threaded the needle of interests in a 
supremely tough case. Egalitarians should welcome such an 
alternative outcome if that had been possible, even if it meant 
forgoing the equality rationale. I think such a narrower solution 
would also have done some good going forward, because the rule 
of reason is closely linked to the goals of equality, in that we need 
to be able to ferret out racial stereotypes that lead to irrational 
fearfulness.10 This outcome would have been far better than what 
 
 9. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). These three had qualms, 
but were convinced by the Chief to stay on board; they offered their thoughts weakly 
instead, as concurring opinions. 
 10. I describe Korematsu as a “tragic precedent,” one that should have been avoided 
by resort to a narrower alternative. The fact that the Justices decided in Ex Parte Endo, 
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we actually got in Korematsu, even though it would not entail 
calling out FDR’s administration for expressing racial animosity. 
Tolson identifies voting rights as another situation where she 
thinks compromise has actually turned out to be counter-
productive. She contends that “our reluctance to call out 
discrimination by name has had far reaching cultural 
consequences and second-order doctrines have proved 
detrimental.”11 Pointing out Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
which allows violations to be shown through disparate impact 
alone rather than intent, she argues that this easier legal standard 
essentially lulled many people—including judges—into thinking 
America had entered some kind of post-racial society. All of that 
set the Supreme Court up to undermine Section 5’s preclearance 
mechanism, Tolson suggests, because we had fewer explicit 
findings of racial discrimination. 
But did overreliance on this easier mechanism really lead to 
the demise of Section 5 years later? For decades, violations were 
found by DOJ and allies of equality. Troubling laws were 
prevented from being implemented mostly through executive 
initiative, as well as investigation and activism by civil rights 
advocates. Those were tangible wins for equality, even if they 
didn’t come after complete rounds of litigation and robust judicial 
findings of intentional bias. Each time, friends of equality surely 
celebrated the legal victory, published what had been 
accomplished to deter similar wrongdoing, and built upon those 
actions to stop other equality-threatening measures. 
It strikes me that the Supreme Court’s move to gut the 
Voting Rights Act is better explained by the changing 
composition of that body or the cultural climate, rather than by 
any inherent flaw in a more lenient legal standard or the Justices’ 
choice to duck this question briefly using the constitutional 
avoidance rule. That institution’s creeping hostility seems general 
to voting rights, not specific to any particular statute (for that 
matter, there had been efforts to cut back on other civil rights laws 
 
323 U.S. 283 (1944), vindicating a concededly loyal citizen’s right to seek habeas relief from 
within an internment camp, suggests that most of the Justices understood the stakes raised 
by indefinite detention were different from a curfew. That, plus the fact that Justice 
Douglas originally wrote a draft dissent in Korematsu, but was convinced by the majority 
not to publish it, suggested there might have been a moment during deliberation where a 
narrower solution could have won the day. 
 11. Tolson, supra note 5, at 482. 
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during the same time frame). If it was hard enough to get 
executive branch lawyers or judges to deal with discriminatory 
voting rights measures over the years using the more forgiving 
threshold, it stands to reason there would have been even harder 
to win if they insisted upon using only the higher standard. It 
would probably have led to more losses in court. But let’s say it 
also ended up with a few more robust findings of racial bias, what 
then? It’s possible the backlash would have happened sooner, 
with conservative justices emboldened to strike down Section 5, 
or otherwise throw more wrenches into the voting rights 
machinery even earlier than they did.12 
If there’s a slightly counterintuitive feature to this criticism, 
it’s the assumption that if courts had been forced to find more 
racial discrimination in voting, they would have actually done so 
rather than wasted those opportunities; and that having done so, 
they would now be more willing to find racial inequality today. I 
think there might have been some increase in raw doctrinal 
resources if this had played out the way Tolson posits. But I’m not 
convinced that even if more voting rights lawsuits had resulted in 
findings of explicit discrimination over the years, that would have 
altered the conservative trajectory with regard to voting rights all 
that much.13 
 
 12. Tolson vividly shows how the fight over voting rights in the Fifth Circuit has even 
descended into squabbling among judges, with one side accusing the other of “racial name 
calling.” Those opposed to voting rights also worried that “a wide swatch of racially neutral 
election measure will be subject to challenge.” Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 317 (5th Cir. 
2016) (en banc) (opinion of Clement, J.). This episode illustrates two of the recurring 
obstacles to equality that I identify: worries about the social consequences of labeling 
someone a bigot and concerns about the disruptive effects of vindicating the principle. 
 13. Tolson discusses the remarkable twists and turns in the Veasey v. Abbott litigation 
in the Fifth Circuit, which involved one group of judges striking down a voter ID law based 
solely on the effects-only approach, only to have later groups of judges demand a search 
for invidious intent for the reason, on the ground that the effects-only application by the 
lower court raised constitutional concerns. I think this affair reveals the broader 
ideological battle between a color-blind vision with restricted methods that some 
conservative justices prefer, and a more aggressive equality-seeking vision that is more 
permissive as to methods for doing justice. This key moment of apparent ideological shift 
can certainly make it difficult to toggle between first-order and second-order solutions as 
a plaintiff or a judge. But I think it also illustrates the overriding need to be flexible among 
methods. Where Tolson sees a disaster partially attributable to the effects-only approach, 
I see a lower court and initial panel doing the best it can under the circumstances, given 
the dynamics in play. The trial judge’s decision to opt immediately for the effects-only 
approach does raise a predictive question that Tebbe also raises, and I treat that thoughtful 
concern there since it’s from the same vantage point as a district judge in the travel ban 
litigation. See infra text accompanying notes 25-27. 
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There are plenty of areas where the federal judiciary has 
been highly engaged for a time, and then decided to leave the field 
of action, never to return (integration immediately comes to 
mind, though sometimes they leave and reengage once again, as 
with the death penalty), and the fact that they’ve found 
discrimination in the past is no longer enough to keep them 
involved. Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the 
generally stricter intent-based approach has been available and 
has even been used from time to time in the voting rights 
context.14 The wax and wane of judicial attentiveness is caused 
more by external factors like national elections and broader 
ideological shifts than the internal features of past resolutions. 
Let’s also not forget: Congress reauthorized the VRA in 
2006. The vote in the House was overwhelming, while the vote in 
the Senate was unanimous. Even this legislative affirmation of the 
VRA’s continuing need, and President George W. Bush’s promise 
to “vigorously defend the provisions of this law,” didn’t give the 
Roberts Court much pause when the Shelby County dispute came 
along. The dream of a post-racial order, and some jurists’ fervent 
hope of imposing it upon the law, despite continued evidence of 
efforts to undermine voting rights, is a serious problem. But is it 
really caused by the fact that advocates preferred the unequal 
effects test? 
Don’t get me wrong: post-racial dreaming has often been an 
obstacle to equality. It’s just not limited to our time. Nor do I think 
it is caused by the multiplicity of liberation tactics employed by 
friends of justice. Instead, this longing for a society purged of 
inequality is probably shaped by a strong preference for liberal 
neutrality, a cultural difficulty in grappling with intergenerational 
wrongs, and a mostly resurgent conservative politics since the 
1960s. 
In a different vein, both Tolson and Tebbe are concerned 
that in a situation involving competing claims between equality 
and free speech, such as in the case of limits on corporate spending 
 
 14. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (invoking Fifteenth Amendment 
to invalidate provision of Hawaii Constitution that limited right to vote for agency’s 
trustees to native Hawaiians); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down 
residency rule for voting under Fourteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 
(1944) (holding that whites-only primary denied equal protection of the laws); Guinn v. 
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking down so-called grandfather clause exemptions 
to literacy clauses because they were designed to interfere with voting rights of black 
citizens). 
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during political campaigns or in the case of a baker who refuses to 
offer his services to a gay couple’s wedding, practical 
egalitarianism gives us no clear path forward. It’s true that the 
approach won’t make things simpler for us, though it’s not 
designed to do that. Instead, it’s an approach that can help us 
think through a broader array of egalitarian interests and possible 
outcomes. 
We’ll still need normative signposts, because where one 
decides it is acceptable to draw the line will depend in part on the 
state of legal doctrine and one’s sense of who is getting the short 
end of the stick under a legal settlement. But the approach may 
be appealing to those who prefer a strong egalitarian solution, 
insofar as it can identify less obvious back-up solutions helpful for 
managing key interests under less than ideal circumstances. That’s 
true for those who are strong proponents of LGBTQ rights, as 
well as those who believe that equality is also at stake when 
someone objects to laws that unduly burden the exercise of 
religion (many of these folks want an even broader set of 
protections for their community, even though it might deny some 
consumers equal respect). I actually think that clear answers 
aren’t wise when there is an inescapable clash of constitutional 
rights; theories that offer up simple solutions like so much candy 
do us a disservice. 
Most people weren’t thrilled with Justice Kennedy’s animus-
based disposition of Masterpiece Cakeshop. The reason is obvious: 
the opinion drew no clear lines in situations involving a clash of 
rights. It didn’t create an entirely new settlement preferred by 
traditionalists, nor did it reaffirm a bright pro-equality line 
preferred by the civil rights community. But it did temporarily 
prevent an overly broad exemption from being created—
something that proponents of LGBT rights feared would 
undermine the efficacy of public accommodations laws. The 
principle that a state agency shouldn’t discriminate on the basis of 
religion in carrying out its work (especially during investigations 
and hearings) is also a welcome principle, and could have wider 
application in ways that help religious minorities as well as those 
who belong to the majority faith. But we’ll certainly need more 
tools for managing situations involving a clash of rights. 
What the resolution in the cake shop controversy suggested 
was that putting off a constitutional question or offering a 
temporary peacekeeping measure (perhaps Kennedy’s opinion 
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did both) can lead to a period where the law itself seems less 
certain. That’s not ideal, but it can be better than alternatives that 
extinguish notions of equality or dissent. 
As for Citizens United, I share Tolson’s concern that treating 
corporations like human beings for free speech purposes could 
have disastrous downstream effects on political equality. It’s 
awkward, and perhaps wrong, to accord for-profit entities the 
same kind of dignity and respect reserved for individuals. At the 
same time, we’ve made this move already, extending such status 
to social groups engaged in political advocacy. I suppose one 
might say that conservatives deployed free speech doctrine as a 
second-best option to protect corporations when the notion of 
equality as it has been developed wouldn’t be ideal. For those of 
us who object to the Court’s wholesale borrowing of equality 
ideas indirectly to benefit corporations, it’s incumbent upon us to 
show what questions are being unwisely submerged and why, even 
after an initial move of holding that corporate speech is protected, 
there are still differences that could justify differential treatment 
of corporations, given their immense power to do good and ill in 
a democratic society. After all, the right to free speech doesn’t 
mean the right to say anything you want wherever you want. 
* 
Tebbe raises a separate, provocative point about how one’s 
tactical decisions could affect the social landscape for ideas. He 
worries that “shirking from dissent can have deleterious effects on 
the acceptability of equality arguments.”15 In particular, he says 
that judicial silence, or even the siphoning of votes from a robust 
equality position, “can isolate egalitarian constitutional 
interpretations, casting them as extreme or radical.”16 
This is an intriguing possibility that he poses—and one that’s 
worth further empirical investigation. But I have my doubts about 
 
 15. Tebbe, supra note 4, at 467. 
 16. Tebbe also argues that “a practice of persistent dissent could anchor the window, 
or force it to expand rather than simply shift.” Id. at 468. Again, maybe. I’m actually 
sympathetic to this argument for rhetorical engagement. But I’m also aware of counter-
examples, such as lonely dissents by Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, and William 
Brennan in death penalty cases. The content of their arguments continue to be worth 
engaging, but I’m not convinced they did much to make anti-death-penalty arguments any 
more plausible than they were at the time. Many of their dissents came during a period of 
general conservative resurgence and a resumption of the death penalty’s use. 
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the hypothesis. For one thing, it runs counter to what I take to be 
the received wisdom, which is that the value and impact of a 
dissent is based largely on its moral clarity and its accuracy in 
looking into the future, rather than how many people embrace it 
at the time it is published. What makes Harlan’s dissent in Plessy 
so potent, despite its flaws, is its insistence that equality is at stake 
in the case, when the rest of his colleagues see racial segregation 
on rail cars as small potatoes. I’ve not seen anyone contend that 
Harlan’s position lacks appeal simply because no one else joined 
him. If anything, the fact that he stands alone against the tide of 
popular opinion and the collective judgment of his own colleagues 
contributes to its longevity. 
Likewise, the beauty of Robert Jackson’s dissent in 
Korematsu can be attributed mostly to his insistence that 
citizenship matters, that “guilt is personal and not inheritable,” 
and his metaphorical likening of the majority’s decision to “a 
loaded weapon.”17 By the same token, Justice Frank Murphy’s 
own dissent stands apart for marshalling all the evidence ignored 
by his colleagues in the majority during its “legalization of 
racism.”18 As far as I can tell, the persuasiveness of these 
expositions on the constitutional wrongfulness of interning 
Japanese Americans during World War II isn’t affected by their 
solo authorship. 
Another reason to be skeptical of the judicial silence thesis is 
that it probably gives judges more power than they actually have 
to shape debate. When a judge articulates a constitutional view, 
that position can be helpful in public discourse because others can 
crib from it and say, “see, a very important person agrees with 
me—you should, too.”19 There’s something special about the 
rhetoric of egalitarianism—what I call its moral dimension—so 
when people in power speak in this particular way about a 
problem, their choice of words signals a unique kind of 
seriousness and judgment. But choosing not to say something 
about a given constitutional provision or issue doesn’t necessarily 
squelch conversation. 
 
 17. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 18. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 19. Elsewhere I’ve advanced the view that such rhetorical participation is a legitimate 
justification for judicial review. ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING 
A FIRST AMENDMENT CULTURE (2008). 
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It’s actually when judges do say something—e.g., when they 
create new doctrinal obstacles to justice or remain too wedded to 
a view—that terrible things can happen. Here’s something else: 
It’s possible that a losing faction on the Court insisting on writing 
a strong, accusatory dissent could actually shut down any 
possibility for movement from initial positions as drafts are being 
circulated in a controversial case. It might even drive those in the 
majority to take a more strident tone or worse, to more broadly 
remake doctrine in ways that are either inegalitarian or seek to 
decide matters that are best left for future cases.20 
There’s a lot that goes into why certain kinds of arguments 
are culturally plausible at any particular historical moment, but 
how many people agree with an orator at the moment of utterance 
probably has little impact. No one later feels bound by what’s in a 
dissent, and I suspect that dissents that misjudge the stakes or the 
moral perspective over time simply disappear under the weight of 
so many other texts. Unless, of course, someone with a platform 
later chooses to rescue a dissent from the dustbin of history. 
Moreover, the way Tebbe poses it—“shirking from 
dissent”—characterizes the articulation of egalitarian norms as 
obligatory, when I wouldn’t put it quite that strongly.21 Instead, 
the egalitarian obligation that I focus upon is the duty to 
ameliorate tangible harms: the unequal suffering experienced by 
someone or some group being singled out. I don’t think judicial 
silence will necessarily demoralize friends of equality, particularly 
if the people in charge give them something constructive to build 
upon. 
There are many ways to talk about this unequally distributed 
harm that should be our focus. Jackson himself in Korematsu 
called it exercising power in a manner that’s “so necessarily 
heedless of the individual.”22 In my book, I prefer the formulation 
offered by John Bingham, who drafted the Fourteenth 
Amendment and talks about the imperative to lift “unequal 
burdens” (quoted at p. 42). Whichever formulation one prefers, 
it’s that humanistic orientation that should inform the strategic 
 
 20. I have in mind McCleskey v. Kemp, a 5-4 case where the majority broadly tries to 
insulate the death penalty from structural equality challenges, but also cases like Bush v. 
Gore, where the winners stopped a recount that decided a presidential election. 
 21. I would not wish to reject this claim out of hand, but I think it needs to be 
defended. 
 22.  Korematsu, 323 U.S at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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calculations made by a committed egalitarian. By contrast, the 
casual indifference that we are all battling is the attitude 
exemplified by Black’s majority opinion in Korematsu, where he 
shrugs that there are always “hardships,” especially in war 
(indeed, he calls war “an aggregation of hardships”23), and some 
people might have to suffer a heavier burden. It’s this kind of 
attitude that tolerates all manner of inequality. 
Now it’s possible that “where the outcome of a particular 
dispute is certain to be inegalitarian,”24 as Tebbe points out, 
there’s nothing left to gain in terms of doing something materially 
significant for an injured party. But at that point the judge or 
public official on a multi-member body is trying to put a happy 
face on a loss. She can opine freely about clarifying the long-term 
egalitarian stakes of an issue, so long as doing so won’t impair her 
ability to make progress in the future. It might make perfect sense 
to dissent boldly—even radically—in that situation. Let’s call that 
what it is: acknowledging defeat while going down swinging. And 
in going down that way, a person might be remembered for 
putting up a fight and others could be inspired to leap into the fray 
next time. 
But practical egalitarianism has bite as the window of 
opportunity for deliberation is closing. While there’s still a 
realistic chance for some of those burdens to be lifted in the 
matter at hand during deliberation, the goal of relieving suffering 
should be paramount, prioritized over a desire to needle one’s 
colleagues, burnish one’s reputation for philosophical consistency 
and erudition, or a desire to shape debate in the uncertain future. 
In such instances, I do think it’s worth sometimes giving up that 
ringing dissent—the possibility of unique rhetorical gain—in 
exchange for achieving an egalitarian outcome. There may be 
another opportunity to issue a forceful statement down the road. 
So, to the judge who has lost a vote I would advise: Worry 
less about diluting a colleague’s dissent and more about whether 
it’s still possible to pry a vote away and change the controlling 
rationale entirely, or else find a way to weaken an inegalitarian 
precedent coming down the pike. 
To press his point, Tebbe asks us to imagine if, instead of 
dissenting in the travel ban case, Breyer and Kagan had laid out 
 
 23.  Id. at 219. 
 24. Tebbe, supra note 4, at 467. 
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their concerns in terms of some other rationale, such as those 
based on fairness. If that had happened, he said that “would have 
isolated Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, and they would have further 
marginalized the argument that Trump in fact promulgated the 
final travel ban as part of a sustained effort to exclude Muslims.”25 
But I fear this concern is overblown. Let’s not forget that the 
most critical player from the standpoint of institutional power was 
always Kennedy. He provided the fifth vote in the case to uphold 
the third version of the ban, and it’s his opinion that carries the 
most weight going forward as judges apply the precedent. In his 
somewhat curious concurring opinion, he stresses that religious 
equality is a principle that governs even in this national security 
context, something four other conservative justices won’t 
concede. It’s Kennedy who didn’t go for the animus rationale, 
believing that the president’s order had changed sufficiently and 
that the rest of the circumstantial evidence wasn’t strong enough. 
But he seemingly left open the possibility that additional evidence 
of the ban-and-waiver system could emerge, and that 
discriminatory intent and effect could still be established in its 
enforcement.26 
Apart from Kennedy’s concurring opinion, everyone else is 
trying to persuade future courts and opinion makers, but from the 
identical disadvantageous perspective of being the losers in the 
dispute. What they say or don’t say can be helpful to others, and 
each has merits on its own terms, but the differences between the 
dissents are marginal at best and don’t dictate who in the future 
might actually use them. 
Imagine a different scenario: had Kennedy been receptive to 
an alternative argument rather than rejecting the religious 
equality claim outright, that’s the moment practical equality has 
 
 25. Tebbe, supra note 4, at 469. On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court sent a strong 
signal about how most of the justices were seeing the case. In granting certiorari to review 
the travel ban cases, it narrowed the injunctions to prevent enforcement of the ban only 
against those with “bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” 
Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project et. al, Nos. 16–1436 (16A1190) and 16–
1540 (16A1191) (June 26, 2017). 
 26. I think the best of way of thinking about Kennedy’s concurring opinion is that he 
rejected a facial equality-based challenge to the travel ban on the record before him, but 
that he left open the possibility that an as-applied challenge could succeed. Justice Breyer’s 
dissent then makes most sense as a road map for pursuing an as-applied attack. In fact, 
those cases are ongoing. See generally Robert L. Tsai, Trump’s Travel Ban Faces Fresh 
Legal Jeopardy, POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2019/03/27/trump-travel-ban-lawsuit-supreme-court-unconstitutional-226103. 
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bite. In that moment, prioritizing harm reduction justifies 
characterizing one’s actions in some other way, so long as it’s 
principled and so long as doing so doesn’t create serious new 
impediments to egalitarian goals. If consensus had coalesced 
around some other rationale, we also would not have had to deal 
with a terrible precedent in which a seemingly watered-down 
version of equality applies, if at all, whenever the President acts 
to hurt non-citizens. All of that’s worth forgoing a dissent. For 
instance, had Kennedy been willing to join a more limited 
decision that relied on the immigration statute to deny, on the 
facts, the president’s ability to restrict entry, that would have been 
a fine instance of doing equality by other means. Alas, that was 
not in the cards. 
The tougher question might be how lower courts should 
behave when they are faced with disagreement from colleagues or 
anticipate a hostile court higher in the pecking order. This is 
because there is a larger predictive element to their pragmatic 
calculations. Further twists and turns will happen because further 
proceedings in controversial cases are unavoidable. Plus, 
everyone knows that trial judges hate to be reversed. How can this 
instinct of self-preservation be made to serve the interests of 
justice rather than thwart it? Should a judge go for broad equality 
rationales before them to stake out the strongest moral view 
possible or narrower ones that might be sustained on appeal? If a 
lower court guesses right, she can do some good for equality; if 
she opts for less when something more could have been achieved, 
that’s a missed opportunity. 
In Practical Equality, I held up the Ninth Circuit’s original 
travel ban decision as worthy of praise. There, at least one judge 
on the panel expressed strong reservations about the animus 
claim during oral argument.27 I defended the panel’s decision to 
ignore the religious equality claim so its members could reach a 
unanimous decision on due process grounds, even though this 
rationale offered relief to a narrower group of injured parties than 
a broad equality-based rationale might have. This decision 
 
 27. One of the Ninth Circuit judges wondered aloud at oral argument whether 
animus was fairly inferred from the ban itself, which didn’t apply to Muslims worldwide, 
and from Trump’s campaign speeches given in a boisterous political context. At this early 
point in the litigation, this revealed limits to the Romer analogy, where animus against gay 
people was inferred from unmistakable reference to homosexuality as well as the breadth 
of a ballot measure’s effects (pp. 73-80). See also Kate Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: 
Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71 (2017). 
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chipped away at the ban, giving relief to permanent residents and 
those affected by the so-called “Christian preference.” These 
were wins for equality that could be built upon. 
Tebbe asks: is this decision measurably better than the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision, which struck down the ban on animus 
grounds? I won’t try to answer that question conclusively, but 
instead recognize that each might have been a defensible way of 
discharging one’s duty to do the work of equality, within the 
specific context one must act. That calculation can vary slightly 
from institution to institution, or in this case, from panel to panel. 
The very first decision against travel ban 1.0, based on 
fairness grounds, came down on February 9, 2017, and led the 
administration to withdraw its appeal and revise its policy within 
a month. Those were the immediate effects of the original 
fairness-based ruling that has often been overlooked in the 
aftermath of the huge loss for equality in the Supreme Court, one 
that deserves to be celebrated. A different approach, exemplified 
in district court rulings on travel ban 2.0 and the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in May 2017, sounded in religious discrimination. The 
animus solution, championed by Tebbe and many others, was also 
practical in its own way, as it hoped to appeal to Justice Kennedy, 
who in non-national security contexts had found that rationale 
convincing. 
My concern isn’t with choosing between the two in a 
definitive sense. Both are valuable—and both shaped the public 
debate. I think it’s fair to say that the Ninth Circuit’s unanimous 
first decision based on due process was a major factor in forcing 
the administration to rethink its approach, while the overall 
drumbeat of court losses on multiple grounds—including the 
animus one—led to further revisions of the policy. 
I happen to think that the animus approach has its pitfalls, 
and that while it often seems like a narrow ground, at times it can 
actually seem more threatening to those worried about the effects 
of decisions. But the main point here is that practical equality isn’t 
an either/or project. Indeed, I explicitly reject such a mentality. 
Instead, we must condition ourselves to always be strategizing 
along multiple dimensions at once: both in terms of the ideal and 
what might be acceptable as a fallback. Sometimes, a different 
kind of argument must serve as a substitute for equality because 
so many of the necessary social conditions aren’t right. The Jim 
Crow South in the 1930s is my leading example, when the 
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Supreme Court’s own equality jurisprudence in the criminal 
justice context was paltry relative to the people’s needs and the 
culture of unequal justice remained potent. On other occasions—
and I think the travel ban situation falls into this second group—
there really are several answers that can be good on egalitarian 
grounds and are culturally plausible. The question then becomes: 
What will get a key player to bite? 
A final thought on sorting through various kinds of harms in 
equality disputes. Both Tebbe and Tolson separately point out 
that tradeoffs among choices are hard to calculate.28 This is true. I 
wish I had a magical formula for prioritizing among the harms that 
confront us. I certainly don’t propose a strict utility-maximizing 
approach—even if it were a more humanitarian version than one 
often sees in the literature. But I also think that making such 
tough choices is unavoidable when it comes to doing the hard, 
unglamorous spadework of equality. The most serious, everyday 
resistance to justice comes simply from the frustrating sense that 
inequality is too big a problem to solve. We can’t be distracted by 
those who insist that wherever we draw a line, someone will be 
left on the wrong side of it. 
For now, what I can say is the following. First, let’s consider 
a recent example of defensible line-drawing that had pro-equality 
consequences. In attacking felon disenfranchisement in Florida, 
reformers had to decide whether to stake out a strong egalitarian 
position that no one should ever lose the right to vote, or to 
exclude certain categories of offenders likely to put the ballot 
measure at risk of failing. They ultimately did the latter by 
excluding people guilty of murder or felony sexual offense, and 
that decision paid off when citizens approved a historic measure 
that amended the state’s constitution and restored the vote to 
some 1.4 million people. Purists could still build on the 
remarkable victory by trying to get rid of disenfranchisement 
altogether, but this change alone addressed major imbalances in 
terms of race, poverty, education, and perceived party affiliation 
wreaked by the state’s practices.29 
 
 28. Tebbe writes: “Referring again to the example of the travel ban, Tsai argues that 
travelers and especially refugees should not suffer uncertainty or indefinite 
postponement.” Tebbe, supra note 4, at 472. 
 29. Before the ballot measure was approved, the racial disparities were stark: 1 out 
of every 5 black Florida citizens could not vote due to its harsh disenfranchisement practice 
(pp. 206-213). At the end of June 2019, however, the governor signed a bill that would still 
require a person convicted of a felony to pay outstanding court-ordered financial penalties 
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Second, it might help if we have a more systematic way of 
sifting through bigger and smaller forms of inequality. To that 
end, I am working on projects that I hope can aid us in thinking 
more concretely about the various forms that inequality has 
historically assumed.30 This will hopefully improve the way we 
talk about types of inequality that are interrelated, but also show 
why different kinds of remedies are necessary. 
Third, while the responsibility for doing the work of equality 
that I describe transcends social roles, in practice what each 
person can be expected to do is also necessarily constrained by 
such roles to some degree. Judges, for example, are constrained 
in ways that politicians and activists aren’t. Tebbe says, “Those 
who did not benefit from the administration’s adjustments to the 
travel ban—adjustments that Tsai credits to the Ninth Circuit’s 
due process rulings—are now permanently deprived of relief.”31 
Well, shouldn’t we lay most of the blame for these inequities at 
the feet of the Administration, rather than the judges who are 
trying to reduce the harms visited upon vulnerable populations by 
that policy? Whereas public officials and citizens acting through 
mechanisms of direct democracy can seize the initiative to deal 
with inequality in sweeping fashion, all judges can do is address 
the claims that come before them. It’s defensible to prioritize the 
unequal burdens faced by permanent residents and others with 
ties to the United States, if that’s what is practicable, and if doing 
so doesn’t create significant obstacles to justice for other groups. 
I could be wrong, but I don’t see anything in the panel’s decision 
that prevents dealing with the plight of others harmed by the ban 
down the road. 
In the end, this is all we can ask for: reducing callous 
treatment by the state and lifting unjustified burdens, while 
leaving open opportunities for future debate. Whether public 
officials have met their obligations, I hope we can all agree, is a 
vastly different question. 
 
 
before restoration of his right to vote. See Mark Skoneki, Amendment 4: DeSantis Signs 
Bill Requiring Ex-felons to Pay Fines Before Voting Rights are Restored, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (June 28, 2019), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ne-amendment-4-
law-signed-20190628-k644veeddjdslbcftyi2wna3n4-story.html. Lawsuits have been filed to 
try to enjoin this new law. 
 30. See, e.g., Robert L. Tsai, Racial Purges, 118 MICH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019). 
 31.  Tebbe, supra note 4, at 472. 
